Monkey Maven: exposing primate exploitation

Different coat color may not mean different species for lemurs: "Different coat color may not mean different species for lemurs

Mouse lemurs with distinct coat colors and shared genetics.

New Haven, Conn. -- Researchers have found that lemurs suspected to belong to different species because of their strikingly different coat colors, are not only genetically alike, but belong to the same species.

Historically, species classification has been based on comparison of visible physical characteristics of plants or animals. Kellie Heckman, a post-doctoral fellow in ecology and evolutionary biology at Yale, and her colleagues at other universities, used analysis of a mitochondrial gene, cytochrome b, to test the genetic relationship of 70 lemurs that were thought to belong to up to three different species. Their report was published in the open access journal BMC Evolutionary Biology.

'Our study combined morphological, genetic, geographic, and ecological data giving a multidimensional, and hopefully more accurate picture of species diversity,' said Heckman. 'Over the past decade, the number of proposed species of these lemurs has jumped from two to fifteen, based on physical differences. It pointed to the need for caution when identifying new species solely on the basis of visual or genetic characteristics.'

The lemurs they tested had three extremely different coat colors and lived in different types of forest locations in southern Madagascar -- classic characteristics of separate species. These researchers chose to compare mitochondrial cytochrome b as a gene marker that is known to change at a rate similar to that of speciation. Other common nuclear genes may evolve more slowly or more rapidly with population drift.

Surprisingly, the researchers found that although the lemurs appeared to be different species because they were visually distinct, they did not differ genetically. According to the sequence of their cytochrome b genes, all belong to the same previously identified species, Microcebus griseorufus.

The authors also show that lemurs with each of the three different coat colors could be found in all three geographical locations in similar proportions. They note that lemurs are nocturnal animals and tend to depend on auditory cues, or smell, more than on visual cues to recognise each other. They say that this could explain why a certain amount of variation in coat color does not affect species recognition in the mouse lemurs.

"There is a remarkable amount of diversity in primates," said Heckman. "We wanted to more thoroughly document this with both morphologic and genetic analysis."

Nov 15, 2006

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Chimpanzee and human genes studied

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The Primate Perspective: Psychological well-being

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Unraveling where chimp and human brains diverge

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Animal Welfare Act - Exposed!

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UC Berkeley Hosts PETA's Primate Expert : Indybay

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They think, feel pain.

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Ebola heads for last great apes - health - 11 November 2006 - New Scientist

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New EU limits on primate experimentation under review - New Scientist

New limits on animal experiments under review - Vivisectors in a panic - 11 November 2006

Europe's scientists must make themselves heard on animal experimentation
• 11 November 2006
• Mark Matfield
INSULIN is estimated to have saved the lives of over 5 million diabetics. It was discovered by Frederick Banting and his colleagues in Toronto in 1922, through experiments on dogs and rabbits. Cardiac surgery is only possible because of the heart-lung machine, which bypasses the blood circulation to the heart and allows it to be stopped. This apparatus was developed by John Gibbon in a series of experiments on dogs, conducted between 1937 and the first human open-heart operation in 1955. And although Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin in 1928, he thought it was merely an antiseptic. It was not until 1939 that Howard Florey showed that it was an antibiotic by showing that it could protect mice from a virulent bacterial infection, still the standard test for antibiotic activity.

The scientific case for using animals in research and for the development of new drugs and surgical techniques rests on these and other discoveries. The future of such work is under the spotlight, however, as the European Union updates the legislation covering the use of animals in scientific research. That is why scientific organisations representing more than 37,000 researchers across Europe are this week joining forces to launch the European Coalition for Biomedical Research (ECBR). The coalition's task is to address this single item of EU legislation.

The original EU directive on animal experimentation was introduced in 1986. It needs revision because so much has changed since then, both in the scientific uses of animals and in our understanding of animal welfare. For example, transgenic mice had only just been developed in 1986, but the past decade has seen a huge expansion of the use of these genetically modified animals for research.

Our understanding of laboratory animal welfare has also evolved. Since 1986, the fundamental ethical principles of replacing animals in experiments where possible, reducing the numbers of animals used in experiments and refining the experiments to improve animal welfare have become broadly accepted across Europe. These principles are not mentioned at all in the current directive but ought to be included in the revision.

After several years of preparatory work on how to revise the animal experimentation directive, the European Commission recently held a public consultation in which it described the proposal in some detail: this is the last part of the process before a draft directive is written and submitted to the European Parliament.

The proposal sets out a fairly sensible scheme based on the system used in the UK. The commission has cherry-picked the best parts of the UK system but avoided most of the bureaucracy that it entailed, which has been the focus of much criticism in recent years.

While generally reasonable, however, the proposal contains some worrying ideas, including one which could drastically affect the use of the most common types of non-human primates in animal experiments. The commission proposes to force European researchers to use only non-human primates that have been bred in captivity for two generations. The thinking is that second-generation animals will have little, if any, of the behavioural traits that make wild animals stressed in a caged environment, although there is little evidence to back this up.

The problem is that these primates are almost impossible to obtain and few suppliers, if any, are willing to breed them. As it stands, the proposal would severely limit the use of non-human primates in experiments.

The consequences of this would be severe. Primate research has been essential for developments in several important fields, including asthma treatments, life support for premature babies, vaccines against polio and deep brain stimulation to treat Parkinson's disease. The similarity of their brain structure to humans' means that they are very important for several areas of research in neuroscience. Drug safety legislation requires that primates be used to test biological therapies that are being developed to treat diseases such as cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis.

Another worry is that the European Parliament is bound to try to introduce many changes on an emotive issue like this. The ECBR will be helping its members inform MEPs in their respective countries about the reasons for the continuing need to use animals in medical research. Previous debates on the issue have shown that there is a considerable knowledge gap among MEPs, which needs to be filled.

The ECBR will also be scrutinizing the draft directive line by line and, where there are clauses that need changing, will seek the help of MEPs to ensure that appropriate amendments are tabled, debated and inserted. The objective is to achieve a new directive that balances the need for effective regulation with the need to allow research to proceed without undue delays, bureaucracy or hindrance.

From issue 2577 of New Scientist magazine, 11 November 2006, page 24

Related items:

The terror of overseas monkey farms
Animal experiments on the rise in Scotland
Covance

Nov 10, 2006

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The primate sense of fairness and justice

Science Journal - WSJ.com: "Animals Seem to Have
An Inherent Sense
Of Fairness and Justice
November 10, 2006; Page B1

As there is no such thing as a free lunch, Sammy and Bias had to work for theirs. The two capuchin monkeys (the species once employed by organ grinders) sat in side-by-side cages separated by a mesh barrier while just beyond the bars was a tray holding two cups of food. It was counterweighted so that both monkeys had to pull a bar to haul in lunch, moving the tray snugly against the cage in such a way that Sammy could reach one cup and Bias the other.

But Sammy was in such a hurry to chow down that after grabbing the apple in her cup, she let go of the tray before Bias could dig into her own. The tray snapped out of reach, causing Bias to scream bloody murder. After half a minute, Sammy understood. She reached out for the tray and helped Bias reel it in. Anyone who has been around toddlers will recognize Bias's reaction as a simian, 'That's not fair!'

The concept of equity -- and fury when it is violated -- lies deep in the human psyche. But scientists have long wondered whether it is a product of learning or something innate, from deep in our evolutionary past. That question has taken on added importance as behavioral economists probe why people sometimes make 'irrational' decisions, such as rejecting a payoff that would leave them quantitatively better off if a rival unfairly benefits.

Sammy's reaction, righting the inequity, hints at something even more intriguing: Animals other than humans are not only sensitive to unfairness, but are driven to rectify it. Philosophers have long argued that this ability underlies much of our human morality.

The search for the roots of our sense of equity began, as science often does, with casual observations. Primatologist Frans de Waal of the Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Atlanta, once saw a female chimp, Puist, help her male friend, Luit, chase off a rival. The rival took it out on Puist. Although Puist reached out her hand to Luit in a plea for backup, Luit "did not lift a finger to protect her," recalls Prof. de Waal in a recent paper. You could imagine the "that's not fair!" module in her mind turning on. Once the rival left, Puist "turned on Luit, barking furiously. She chased him across the enclosure and pummeled him."

Treat me unfairly? Take that!

Capuchins, too, know unfairness when they see it. They prefer grapes to cucumbers, and when a scientist gave a grape to one capuchin and a cucumber to another, the latter threw it onto the ground and stalked away rather than acquiesce to this injustice.

Now, the research is moving from observations to experiments, such as the pull-tray that triggered Bias's tantrum. To test how sensitive capuchins are to inequity, Prof. de Waal and colleagues counterweighted the tray so that it required only one monkey to reel it in. In this case, the monkey almost never shares its apple with the monkey who hasn't helped. No work, no pay is fair.

When pulling the tray requires two monkeys' efforts, but only one cup is filled, the lucky monkey often shares its spoils. "Winners were, in effect, compensating their partners for received assistance," Prof. de Waal writes. It was the fair thing to do.

To be sure, a saintly commitment to fairness isn't the only thing going on here. By being magnanimous, the monkey who shares his reward with a hard-working but unrewarded partner makes it more likely that when the tables are turned, she will be treated with equal generosity.

Paired with a relative, monkeys are even more willing to pull the tray, even if their own cup (which they can see from afar) is empty. "Fair," it seems, covers a family member reaping the rewards of your labors even if you don't.

Even when little or no effort is required, chimps and capuchins balk at unfair situations, says anthropologist Sarah Brosnan of Emory University. In a series of experiments, the animals learned to trade a "token" (a rock or plastic pipe) with a trainer for food. If they saw a cagemate trade for a delectable grape, but were offered a cucumber in exchange for their own token, they were much more likely to refuse to hand it over for the stupid vegetable. Better to go hungry than to give in to this unfairness.

A sense of fairness underlies irrational choices by humans, too. Economists assume that economic decisions are rational, but in many cases people prefer to gain less in order to punish someone who is behaving unfairly. If a partner proposes a $7/$3 split of $10 offered in an experiment, many people reject it outright, gaining nothing rather than accepting the inequity. "People are willing to give up their own potential gain to block someone else from unfairly getting more than themselves," says Ms. Brosnan, who points to resistance to globalization and free trade as current examples.

It isn't hard to see the survival value of being able to detect inequity. Cooperation requires a grasp of fairness. You need to be able to detect (and punish) freeloaders to keep a cooperative society running. "Fairness counts," she says. "Humans and other animals are able to detect unfairness because doing so is beneficial."

And, it seems, it's an ancient attribute of the primate mind."

And an (unpublished) letter to the editor that I wrote in response:
Editor,

Thank you for your insightful piece about the primate mind and fairness (“Animals Seem to Have an Inherent Sense of Fairness and Justice,” 11/10). What are the implications of knowing that chimpanzees come to the aid of a friend or that their “‘that’s not fair’ module” goes on when a favor is not returned? If individual primates “punish” those who don’t play by the rules—and if they can perceive and respond to the seemingly subtle lack of fairness of being rewarded with a cucumber instead of a grape—is there any basis for assuming that involuntary confinement, social isolation, painful procedures, and other violations of their interests imposed by people don’t register? The answer is “No.”

Primate behavior is compelling and, not surprisingly, it inspires our empathy for nonhuman primates. But that empathy can go much farther. Monkeys subjected to painful experiments in laboratories are harder to ignore when we think of the examples in your article. As ethical beings and as people who have a fuller understanding of the minds, emotions, and lives of all primates, we simply cannot sanction their exploitation.

Nov 9, 2006

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